Month: September 2010

Categories
exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam reading: Risk perception in science communication

People are notoriously bad at judging risk- we’re fascinated by rare, unusual events but blase about common and everyday hazards. This page is an interesting example- the comparison of lightning fatalities and shark-related fatalities between Florida and Hawaii is instructive, and bunnies in New York City are apparently really ornery…

A big part of science communication involves talking about risk and uncertainty, so this is a big deal. Today’s exam reading is by Paul Slovic: “Perception of Risk from Radiation” from Radiation Protection Dosimetry, 1996.

Summary: Slovic takes a rhetorical approach to communicating radiation risks-in this case, experts’ assessments of risk don’t match those of public. Public risk perception is based more on “dread” (emotion, voluntariness) and event unfamiliarity, while experts base assessments on probability of occurrence plus severity. There’s a psychological “signal effect”- rare, unfamiliar events are more scary than common, familiar ones. These differences in perception have social/political impact (e.g., Three-Mile Island had minor health effects but led to widespread public oppoisition to nuclear power.) Radiation is associated with “cosmic transmutation,” contamination, taint, and cancer; it’s a highly emotional type of pollution, e.g., there can be social stigma attached to people exposed to radiation because of “taint.” Nuclear and chemical risk perceptions share some similarities, e.g., medical applications are perceived as low-risk while environmental applications (pesticides, power plants) are high-risk. In communication, the challenge is getting from expert knowledge to recommendations for public (typical approach is to compare to a familiar risk, but be careful to compare similar hazards- nuclear exposure to x-rays, rather than nuclear exposure to chance of being struck by lightning.) There are large ethical issues with communication, because of strong framing effects- more pragmatically, it’s easy to destroy trust and hard to build it.

Comments: Slovic’s paper is more applied than theoretical, but he does mention some wider issues. For example, mentions ethical concerns around framing. Another big issue is that any type of media attention to an issue (even if saying “there’s no risk associated with doing x”) will tend to lead to perceptions of more risk surrounding that issue- this obviously has practical implications for communicating science.

Links to: Trench (risk=hazard + outrage); Irwin (risk from communications perspective); Nisbet (framing)

Categories
environment exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam reading: Science comm for environmental issues

And here’s an applied example of the “deficit-dialogue” non-transition. Peter Groffman, Cathlyn Stylinski, Matthew C. Nisbet, Carlos M. Duarte, Rebecca Jordan, Amy Burgin, M. Andrea Previtali, and James Coloso: “Restarting the conversation: challenges at the interface between ecology and society,” from a Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment special issue.

Summary: Science communication and outreach efforts are not currently sufficient to engage the public in pressing environmental issues. The authors summarize current social research and make recommendations. Scientists are widely respected on social-policy issues, but need to rethink outreach efforts. Awareness of environmental issues varies widely (demographics, nationality) and other issues (esp. economy) currently are rated more important; communicators can increase salience of issues by connecting them to people’s lives. Most people learn about scientific issues individually, informally, and sporadically; in the U.S., mainly via TV, but the Internet is a prime source of science info for those who deliberately seek it out (selective perception and interpretation are important). The largest effect of media campaigns is awareness, rather than factual knowledge. Audiences are influenced by presentation, e.g., give both views represented equal weight. Scientists tend to focus on information deficit, rather than changing attention/salience; here’s where framing and mental models come in. There are also new tools and approaches to use: formal research communication, training for young scientists, participation in local social forums, online news communities (e.g., science blogs + news), public participation in research, and recruiting opinion leaders (social networks, etc.)

Comments: Article is introduction to a special issue of journal; other papers go into detail about some of the new approaches mentioned.

Links to: Trumbull et al., Bonney et al., Brossard et al. (public participation in research); Nisbet (framing)

Categories
exam readings politics science communication

Exam reading: “Towards an analytical framework”

In this chapter, Brian Trench comments on various models for science communication. “Towards an Analytical Framework of Science Communication Models” from Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New Models, New Practices.

Summary: Trench posits that the deficit to dialogue model transition has been overstated in sci. comm. circles (it’s more a normative recommendation than a descriptive assessment.) He puts science comm. into the broader context of communications theory (e.g., active audience, risk comm. composed of hazard (probability) + outrage (subjective elements)) and education (e.g., inquiry- and project-based learning). The process of dialogue is not free of power relations, and in practice “dialogue” is often like marketing/message tailoring research. While there is evidence of trends toward more open dialogue (open public debate, scientists active in NGOs), the converse is also true, esp. because of the knowledge economy (commodification of knowledge, the cultural/social values of science are obscured). Overall, the deficit model is still used for much of sci comm (appropriately, in some cases); there’s really a continuum of “dialogue.” His framework goes from deficit to dialogue to participation models. More specifically, deficit includes defense of science and marketing; dialogue includes context, consultation, engagement of public; and participation includes deliberation and critique. He briefly discusses the philosophical/ideological implications of this spectrum.

Comments: Provides a counterpoint to idea of thorough deficit-dialogue shift. In contrast to Shamos, states that scientism is wide trend among scientists, and related to assumption of deficit; their definitions of scientism are different.

Links to: Bucchi (similar discussion of lack of deficit-dialogue binary); Shamos (characterizes scientism as anti-science, not a majority scientific view)

Categories
exam readings knowledge work politics science communication science studies

Exam readings: Science in the knowledge economy

These are both chapters from Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New Models, New Practices that put science communication into a very wide context of societal changes.

In “Representation and Deliberation: New Perspectives on Communication Among Actors in Science and Technology Innovation,” Giuseppe Pellegrini wants to reform the way democracy operates:

Summary: Pellegrini takes on the relationships between scientific experts, business, political institutions, and the public, and suggests that new governance models are needed for developing technical-scientific fields (e.g., nano, biotech, communications). He contrasts representative democracy (public delegates decision-making to political class, they delegate it to scientific & business experts) to deliberative democracy (participation of all interested parties.) In recent years, doubt has been cast on both scientific experts as a community of objective decision makers (e.g., scientists going into business), and on political institutions’ ability to regulate business or even remain functional (e.g., globalization, collapse of the social contract). This has been facilitated by: greater communication, the speed of scientific and technological changes in recent years, the end of consequence-free perception of progress, and a new appreciation of the uncertainty inherent in science (facilitated by a conflict-driven media.) Pellegrini suggests a new view of rights of citizens, which would include access to opportunities to participate in scientific social decision-making, and access to information about government workings (and ability to communicate directly with decision-makers). This would expand the deliberative aspects of democracy past traditional voting, or delegation of decision-making powers to elites.

Comments: Pellegrini is not clear about who will guarantee or fund these new communication rights of citizens, or guarantee that vested interests will not attempt to manipulate the system via traditional advertising, etc., (but acknowledges these are valid criticisms), and it’s also unclear how decisions will actually be made (he’s explicitly advocating more open discussion about science-tech-society issues, not decision-making.) He does mention that not all participants’ views should be equal (so still a role for experts). Mention of “powerful and authoritative scientists” making society’s decisions is ironic, given the recent state of political discourse in the U.S.

With somewhat related themes, Bernard Schiele’s “On and About the Deficit Model in an Age of Free Flow” redefines scientific literacy in the “knowledge economy.”

Summary: Schiele’s view is that science has become integrated into the “information society” to such an extent that the deficit model of communication is no longer useful. Science began by openly communicating in the vernacular, but increasing specialization and the rise of professional science communicating media separated science “producers” from “consumers.” The deficit model assumed that both science literacy and political literacy were necessary for citizens to participate in sci-tech decision-making processes. Shiele believes that the boundary between science and non-science is becoming blurred (e.g., psychology), and that the communication process is now about fostering multiple connections between science and society. He connects these changes to the knowledge economy: universities collaborating with industry (and communicating results to public), research is becoming more applied (problem-solving and products), and scientists are also becoming replaceable knowledge workers. The public now feels able to comment on the directions research takes; non anti-science, but feels that “progress” is not the answer.

Comments: I’m not sure to what extent Schiele’s characterization of scientists as replaceable knowledge workers is accurate. He seems to equate expertise with the ability to marshal (publicly available) knowledge at need and adapt to different contexts (so everyone could potentially succeed in any field); I don’t think this knowledge flexibility necessarily maps to understanding how knowledge is created & interpreted within different domains. He also seems to be defining science literacy as a way of thinking about science and scientific culture, and assuming that the public is educated about science/scientific institutions (as cultural actors; not about how the scientific process works.)

Links to: Shamos (very different definition of scientific literacy)

Categories
exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam readings: Science cafes and framing

This weekend, I spent two days drifting from Panera to Panera, and got a lot of reading done (although I feel like a dork for spending my weekend cafe-hopping). Did not get a lot else accomplished, aside from bunny torture (took Noe to the vet- she is fine, just had arthritis acting up). I’ll post my reading summaries as I write them up. Here are two semi-related papers on the theme of communicating science:

First, Jan Riise’s “Bringing Science to the Public,” from Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New Models, New Practices, focuses on informal science events. (As a side note, Orlando has a monthly Science Cafe, but it always seems to be scheduled on a night I have class…)

Summary: Discusses the importance of scientists speaking to the public directly, in informal settings- events, “science cafes,” online. The location and venue of such interactions is important, e.g., cafes at coffeeshops, festivals and street events at various venues. These events can attract passers-by, they’re on neutral ground (less intimidation), and people don’t need to venture into formal settings. Different audiences might frequent different venues (older, educated folks at lectures, young adults at malls). Such events are becoming more common among scientists for two reasons: communication is becoming thought of as a negotiation, and it’s now considered an integral part of the scientific process. One key aspect is the face-to-face interactions between scientists and the public without mediation- opens up space for discussion. There is, however, a need for support and training for scientists for these events. Finally, different types of content are discussed: basic understanding, “fun” science (e.g., contests), academic-level science, science in culture (partner with arts & humanities content), and “new” discovery science.

Comments: Riise’s evidence is mainly anecdotal, and based in Sweden, but this is an area of active development in many regions. Mentions Internet comm. in passing, but doesn’t discuss it again.

Next,Matt Nisbet’s “Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement” applies some mass-media communication theory to science communication. His approach contrasts with sci. comm. researchers who are focused on increasing dialogue; mainly this is due to medium.

Summary: Nisbet’s focus is on increasing public engagement with science (specifically global warming), rather than public education. While traditional approaches to sci comm assume that wider coverage leads to wider understanding and engagement, research shows that people have selective interest in news (generally what’s salient for them personally.) GW in particular is a highly-partisan issue in the U.S., and barriers include its complexity and the fragmented nature of news media (e.g., easier to read just sources that agree with you.) Nisbet advocates framing GW in order to connect the issue with targeted groups- tailoring the message while remaining true to the science. Likens framing to creating interpretive storylines that allow people to connect a new issue with underlying mental models. For GW, liberal and conservative commentators/institutions frame the issue in different ways, maintaining the partisan divide (“Pandora’s Box,” public accountability vs. uncertainty, conflict, economics.) Each frame can include pro/neutral/anti positions, so it is possible to reframe or use frame in novel ways. The overall idea is to identify possible frames to unify partisan divide, and effect greater engagement by increasing issue salience.

Comments: Nisbet’s aim is to increase the salience of issues, rather than purely factual communication; this is different focus than some other authors, who take a more educational stance. He mentions critique of framing because it’s similar to political “spin,” but maintains that it’s a different process- perhaps because of “remaining true” to underlying science.) Framing here replaces the deficit model (assumption that more information is what is needed.)

Categories
exam readings pedagogy research methods/philosophy science studies

Exam reading: “The myth of scientific literacy”

Morris Shamos’ “Myth of Scientific Literacy” starts off with some grim estimates on the state of scientific literacy in the U.S.: maybe 5-7% of Americans are scientifically literate- able to not only understand science terminology and know some basic facts, but also understand how the scientific process works. While this book was published in 1995, the situation hasn’t changed much.

Summary: Shamos claims that U.S. educational policy (in many iterations) has been trying to increase general science literacy and increase numbers of science-career students, and failing at both. Science is difficult because it requires a non-commonsense mode of thought; deductive/syllogistic thinking (commonsense) can lead to correct conclusions from incorrect assumptions, and science rests on a combination of deduction, induction, quantitative reasoning, and experimentation. Through the history of science education, there has been debate over what to teach and why; Shamos suggests three levels of sci. literacy: cultural (understand some terminology), functional (know some facts), and “true” literacy (understand scientific process). “Science” education generally is focused on technology or natural history studies (not sci. process)- which would be OK for “science awareness,” but also need to add an understanding of the use of experts to assist in making societal decisions. Broad-based sci. literacy is hampered by several factors: mathematical illiteracy, lack of social incentives, science can be boring & hard to learn, and disparagement by public intellectuals (and others.) He especially cautions against movements to discredit rationalism as the best basis with which to relate nature to society through science.

Comments: On use of experts: failing to create a truly sci. literate citizenry (which Shamos suggests is impossible), he suggests a system of public science experts who help make decisions in a transparent way (with citizen watchdog groups.) Overall, wide-ranging discussion of science education, philosophy of science, and possible future models for science education (also incorporating adult ed, though he focuses on formal ed.)

Links to: Pellegrini (models of citizen-scientist expert interactions); Holton (“anti-science” forces)

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bunny

Friday bunnyblogging

Let’s take a trip back to the past and meet baby Noe: the cutest bunny EVER:

When she was small, her ears grew really quickly, and it took a few weeks for the cartilage to support their weight. So she had these floppy ears for a while. She’s about 5 mos. old in these photos:

No, she did not get mondo lettuce leaves like this all the time. But it is certainly cute.

Categories
exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam readings: how scientists see reporters, online persuasion

No extra commentary today: I’m powering through a bunch of papers.

First paper: Peters, Brossard, de Cheveigné, Dunwoody, Kallfass, Miller and Tsuchida. “Science-Media Interface: It’s Time to Reconsider.” 2008.

Summary: This paper is a further analysis of the authors’ recent survey on attitude of scientists to reporters, in response to criticism; the major finding that was controversial was that most scientists’ recent experience with journalists were positive. Scientists’ assessments of media coverage of science overall were neutral and there were concerns with the process of science journalism, but they rated their personal experiences positively. While past scientist-journalist studies had reported greater problems, the sci-media relationship has been addressed (e.g., workshops) for several years, but there is still the primary issue that meanings of messages change when they go from the scientific to journalistic spheres. Another source of tension might not be recognizing changing sci-media relationships (e.g., professionalization of sci journalism, media strategies of scientists have changed.) They point out that scientists might be more willing to discuss research with journalists (and more trained to communicate with media), but that there is a need for journalists not to be led astray my media-savvy scientists (ecpecting them to be non-savvy.)

Comments: The authors address some of the negatives in the increasing media orientation (medialization) of science research. This includes the possibility that funding/research decisions will be made with publicity in mind, or that PR-related goals are becoming more emphasized than accuracy when scientists talk to reporters (or press releases are created.) Both issues tie into the politics of scientific institutions, and are areas for concern.

Links to: Bucchi (bypassing levels of communication)

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Second article: Minol, Spelsberg, Schulte, and Morris. “Portals, Blogs and Co.: the Role of the Internet as a Medium of Science Communication.” 2007.

Summary: The authors describe an effort to disseminate research about GM crops widely to the public, and influence public attitudes, via the Internet. They point out that it is difficult to evaluate the credibility of online content (anonymity removes consequences.) While Web 2.0 tools have changed the Internet from an info storage medium to a communication medium, even crowdsourced sites (like Wikipedia) can be disproportionately influenced by a small group with inaccurate views. They suggest creating portal sites to provide accurate scientific info. They report about their portal, which is designed to influence public attitudes toward biotechnology in Germany. Their goals are to provide access to info, contextualize risk in scientific terms, promote transparency, and build trust. Their approach has four parts: provide accurate info on testing procedures for GM crops, online “marketing” of the site (search engine optimization), satisfying first time users (usability, aesthetics), and creating user affinity (creating a discussion community.) The portal is accompanied by a mass-media campaign to make scientific viewpoints more well-represented in public discussions of GM crops.

Comments: It sounds like the described portal is a good example of an approach to communication that includes some aspects of dialogue, but is primarily designed for one-way persuasion (even though persuasion is to take into account social valies & not just factual information.)

Links to: Einseidel (forms of public dialogue); Irwin (risk & broader societal impacts of science)

Categories
exam readings research methods/philosophy science studies

Exam reading: “Science and anti-science”

In contrast to yesterday’s reading, Gerald Holton’s “Science and Anti-Science” falls on the opposite side of the empiricist-subjectivist spectrum. It’s a collection of essays written during different periods, and a fair amount of knowledge of the philosophy of science is assumed (particularly in the first two essays.)

Summary: A collection of essays on philosophy of science, beginning with the rise of positivism in the early 20th cen. and the work of Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle. Positivism is based on rejecting metaphysics and hierarchy, in favor of relying on empirically-derived data; explanations should be purely descriptive (not religious, metaphysical, mechanistic.) Three main concepts: no supernatural protectors, so need to help ourselves; we have the capability to improve life for individuals and society; and in order we act we need knowledge- the sci. method is the best way to get knowledge, so science is one of the most valuable tools to improve life. While positivism was the basis of modernism, the increasing importance of relativity and probability theory introduced some philosophical elements to science; these were resisted by some researchers. Holton discusses rhetoric of scientific papers: reliance on demonstration; dual rhetorics of assertion (of one’s own ideas) and appropriation or rejection (of others’ ideas) in communication; describes sci. papers as a dialogue between multiple actors (e.g., author & previous researchers). He defines three types of scientific praxis: Newtonian (“basic”/seeking omniscience), Baconian (“applied”/seeking omnipotence), and Jeffersonian (combined mode of basic research addressing a specific social problem/seeking to improve human life through understanding). Discusses differences between cyclical and linear models of human progress and how these apply to science (e.g., “science carries seeds of own destruction” vs. asymptotically approaching ultimate knowledge.) Final essay discusses “anti-science”: scientism (e.g., Social Darwinism), pseudoscience, superstition (New Age), misguided science (Lysenkoism). Anti-science is a complete worldview, not just an incomplete understanding of scientific worldview. Reasons for acceptance include sci. illiteracy, concerns with technology and global stewardship, and skepticism of authority. Advocates “new humanism” of rationality, acceptance of uncertainty & pluralism, Jeffersonian model of science; discusses ways to counter “traditionalists” and “postmodernists.”

Comments: Holton’s “postmodernism” involves extreme social constructionism; many postmodernist scholars would be moderately happy with his Jeffersonian model of science (though the insistence on science as the best way of knowing about the world would not be popular.) Illustrates use of rhetoric both within science and as a means to foster a scientific worldview and counter “anti-science” in the public sphere.

Categories
exam readings research methods/philosophy science communication science studies

Exam reading: “Crafting science”

Here’s the thing. In philosophy, there is a spectrum of belief about the “reality” of the observable world. This ranges from extreme empiricism (we can only know that which we can measure with our senses, therefore science is the only way to know the world) to extreme postmodern relativism (all perception is subjective, therefore scientific observations are only as accurate as religious or philosophical notions about the world).

Debate among adherents of both philosophies (as well as those who fall somewhere in between) has occasionally been bitter (and has crept into the political realm.) I fall closer to the empirical end of the scale, though I do believe that there is room for discussion of social construction around scientific models and science as an institution.

Joan Fujimura’s “Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and ‘Translation'” comes from a decided social constructionist perspective (for example, a footnote at the beginning assures the reader that she does not consider “facts” to “represent reality.”) That said, she does present an interesting way of looking at they ways in which scientific concepts are transferred among different fields (though I suspect my watered down view of the role of social negotiation in science would seem inadequate to her.) Here is my summary:

Summary: From a social constructionist perspective, scientific knowledge is produced not by consensus or by referring to objective nature, but by negotiation and argument. Fujimura combines Latour’s “boundary objects” with Star & Griesner’s focus on collective negotiation in constructing scientific “facts.” Fujimura suggests that “standardized packages” of both technologies and a theory (i.e., several related boundary objects) facilitate cooperative work by acting as interfaces between different social worlds. The packages allow cross-communication (via “translation”) and cooperation between disciplines, while still letting disciplines maintain the integrity of their viewpoints. Such packages are more rigid than just single boundary objects, because the different parts co-define one another. She uses the example of oncogenes as a recent conceptual framework for cancer research to illustrate how this process works. In this case, boundary objects include concepts (e.g., gene, cancer), databases (which create a standard language), and sequences (DNA & protein). The primary theory is “translated”/mapped onto existing problems in different fields, e.g., links retroviruses (virology) to oncogenes (genetics), then oncogene proteins to proto-oncogenes (developmental & evolutionary biology.) When used together, shared theories and standard tools can ensure “fact stabilization.”

Comments: Provides a framework for how ideas are communicated across disciplines or among interest groups. Can this be used in a less-extreme constructionist setting? If people can argue about multiple perceptions of a thing, then that suggests that there really is a “thing” out there to argue about (in other words, I believe in reality.)

Links to: Hellsten & Nehrlich (metaphors in sci. comm); Bucchi (metaphors for communication between disciplines)