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exam readings knowledge work politics science communication science studies

Exam readings: Science in the knowledge economy

These are both chapters from Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New Models, New Practices that put science communication into a very wide context of societal changes.

In “Representation and Deliberation: New Perspectives on Communication Among Actors in Science and Technology Innovation,” Giuseppe Pellegrini wants to reform the way democracy operates:

Summary: Pellegrini takes on the relationships between scientific experts, business, political institutions, and the public, and suggests that new governance models are needed for developing technical-scientific fields (e.g., nano, biotech, communications). He contrasts representative democracy (public delegates decision-making to political class, they delegate it to scientific & business experts) to deliberative democracy (participation of all interested parties.) In recent years, doubt has been cast on both scientific experts as a community of objective decision makers (e.g., scientists going into business), and on political institutions’ ability to regulate business or even remain functional (e.g., globalization, collapse of the social contract). This has been facilitated by: greater communication, the speed of scientific and technological changes in recent years, the end of consequence-free perception of progress, and a new appreciation of the uncertainty inherent in science (facilitated by a conflict-driven media.) Pellegrini suggests a new view of rights of citizens, which would include access to opportunities to participate in scientific social decision-making, and access to information about government workings (and ability to communicate directly with decision-makers). This would expand the deliberative aspects of democracy past traditional voting, or delegation of decision-making powers to elites.

Comments: Pellegrini is not clear about who will guarantee or fund these new communication rights of citizens, or guarantee that vested interests will not attempt to manipulate the system via traditional advertising, etc., (but acknowledges these are valid criticisms), and it’s also unclear how decisions will actually be made (he’s explicitly advocating more open discussion about science-tech-society issues, not decision-making.) He does mention that not all participants’ views should be equal (so still a role for experts). Mention of “powerful and authoritative scientists” making society’s decisions is ironic, given the recent state of political discourse in the U.S.

With somewhat related themes, Bernard Schiele’s “On and About the Deficit Model in an Age of Free Flow” redefines scientific literacy in the “knowledge economy.”

Summary: Schiele’s view is that science has become integrated into the “information society” to such an extent that the deficit model of communication is no longer useful. Science began by openly communicating in the vernacular, but increasing specialization and the rise of professional science communicating media separated science “producers” from “consumers.” The deficit model assumed that both science literacy and political literacy were necessary for citizens to participate in sci-tech decision-making processes. Shiele believes that the boundary between science and non-science is becoming blurred (e.g., psychology), and that the communication process is now about fostering multiple connections between science and society. He connects these changes to the knowledge economy: universities collaborating with industry (and communicating results to public), research is becoming more applied (problem-solving and products), and scientists are also becoming replaceable knowledge workers. The public now feels able to comment on the directions research takes; non anti-science, but feels that “progress” is not the answer.

Comments: I’m not sure to what extent Schiele’s characterization of scientists as replaceable knowledge workers is accurate. He seems to equate expertise with the ability to marshal (publicly available) knowledge at need and adapt to different contexts (so everyone could potentially succeed in any field); I don’t think this knowledge flexibility necessarily maps to understanding how knowledge is created & interpreted within different domains. He also seems to be defining science literacy as a way of thinking about science and scientific culture, and assuming that the public is educated about science/scientific institutions (as cultural actors; not about how the scientific process works.)

Links to: Shamos (very different definition of scientific literacy)

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exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam readings: Science cafes and framing

This weekend, I spent two days drifting from Panera to Panera, and got a lot of reading done (although I feel like a dork for spending my weekend cafe-hopping). Did not get a lot else accomplished, aside from bunny torture (took Noe to the vet- she is fine, just had arthritis acting up). I’ll post my reading summaries as I write them up. Here are two semi-related papers on the theme of communicating science:

First, Jan Riise’s “Bringing Science to the Public,” from Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New Models, New Practices, focuses on informal science events. (As a side note, Orlando has a monthly Science Cafe, but it always seems to be scheduled on a night I have class…)

Summary: Discusses the importance of scientists speaking to the public directly, in informal settings- events, “science cafes,” online. The location and venue of such interactions is important, e.g., cafes at coffeeshops, festivals and street events at various venues. These events can attract passers-by, they’re on neutral ground (less intimidation), and people don’t need to venture into formal settings. Different audiences might frequent different venues (older, educated folks at lectures, young adults at malls). Such events are becoming more common among scientists for two reasons: communication is becoming thought of as a negotiation, and it’s now considered an integral part of the scientific process. One key aspect is the face-to-face interactions between scientists and the public without mediation- opens up space for discussion. There is, however, a need for support and training for scientists for these events. Finally, different types of content are discussed: basic understanding, “fun” science (e.g., contests), academic-level science, science in culture (partner with arts & humanities content), and “new” discovery science.

Comments: Riise’s evidence is mainly anecdotal, and based in Sweden, but this is an area of active development in many regions. Mentions Internet comm. in passing, but doesn’t discuss it again.

Next,Matt Nisbet’s “Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement” applies some mass-media communication theory to science communication. His approach contrasts with sci. comm. researchers who are focused on increasing dialogue; mainly this is due to medium.

Summary: Nisbet’s focus is on increasing public engagement with science (specifically global warming), rather than public education. While traditional approaches to sci comm assume that wider coverage leads to wider understanding and engagement, research shows that people have selective interest in news (generally what’s salient for them personally.) GW in particular is a highly-partisan issue in the U.S., and barriers include its complexity and the fragmented nature of news media (e.g., easier to read just sources that agree with you.) Nisbet advocates framing GW in order to connect the issue with targeted groups- tailoring the message while remaining true to the science. Likens framing to creating interpretive storylines that allow people to connect a new issue with underlying mental models. For GW, liberal and conservative commentators/institutions frame the issue in different ways, maintaining the partisan divide (“Pandora’s Box,” public accountability vs. uncertainty, conflict, economics.) Each frame can include pro/neutral/anti positions, so it is possible to reframe or use frame in novel ways. The overall idea is to identify possible frames to unify partisan divide, and effect greater engagement by increasing issue salience.

Comments: Nisbet’s aim is to increase the salience of issues, rather than purely factual communication; this is different focus than some other authors, who take a more educational stance. He mentions critique of framing because it’s similar to political “spin,” but maintains that it’s a different process- perhaps because of “remaining true” to underlying science.) Framing here replaces the deficit model (assumption that more information is what is needed.)

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exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam readings: how scientists see reporters, online persuasion

No extra commentary today: I’m powering through a bunch of papers.

First paper: Peters, Brossard, de Cheveigné, Dunwoody, Kallfass, Miller and Tsuchida. “Science-Media Interface: It’s Time to Reconsider.” 2008.

Summary: This paper is a further analysis of the authors’ recent survey on attitude of scientists to reporters, in response to criticism; the major finding that was controversial was that most scientists’ recent experience with journalists were positive. Scientists’ assessments of media coverage of science overall were neutral and there were concerns with the process of science journalism, but they rated their personal experiences positively. While past scientist-journalist studies had reported greater problems, the sci-media relationship has been addressed (e.g., workshops) for several years, but there is still the primary issue that meanings of messages change when they go from the scientific to journalistic spheres. Another source of tension might not be recognizing changing sci-media relationships (e.g., professionalization of sci journalism, media strategies of scientists have changed.) They point out that scientists might be more willing to discuss research with journalists (and more trained to communicate with media), but that there is a need for journalists not to be led astray my media-savvy scientists (ecpecting them to be non-savvy.)

Comments: The authors address some of the negatives in the increasing media orientation (medialization) of science research. This includes the possibility that funding/research decisions will be made with publicity in mind, or that PR-related goals are becoming more emphasized than accuracy when scientists talk to reporters (or press releases are created.) Both issues tie into the politics of scientific institutions, and are areas for concern.

Links to: Bucchi (bypassing levels of communication)

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Second article: Minol, Spelsberg, Schulte, and Morris. “Portals, Blogs and Co.: the Role of the Internet as a Medium of Science Communication.” 2007.

Summary: The authors describe an effort to disseminate research about GM crops widely to the public, and influence public attitudes, via the Internet. They point out that it is difficult to evaluate the credibility of online content (anonymity removes consequences.) While Web 2.0 tools have changed the Internet from an info storage medium to a communication medium, even crowdsourced sites (like Wikipedia) can be disproportionately influenced by a small group with inaccurate views. They suggest creating portal sites to provide accurate scientific info. They report about their portal, which is designed to influence public attitudes toward biotechnology in Germany. Their goals are to provide access to info, contextualize risk in scientific terms, promote transparency, and build trust. Their approach has four parts: provide accurate info on testing procedures for GM crops, online “marketing” of the site (search engine optimization), satisfying first time users (usability, aesthetics), and creating user affinity (creating a discussion community.) The portal is accompanied by a mass-media campaign to make scientific viewpoints more well-represented in public discussions of GM crops.

Comments: It sounds like the described portal is a good example of an approach to communication that includes some aspects of dialogue, but is primarily designed for one-way persuasion (even though persuasion is to take into account social valies & not just factual information.)

Links to: Einseidel (forms of public dialogue); Irwin (risk & broader societal impacts of science)

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exam readings research methods/philosophy science communication science studies

Exam reading: “Crafting science”

Here’s the thing. In philosophy, there is a spectrum of belief about the “reality” of the observable world. This ranges from extreme empiricism (we can only know that which we can measure with our senses, therefore science is the only way to know the world) to extreme postmodern relativism (all perception is subjective, therefore scientific observations are only as accurate as religious or philosophical notions about the world).

Debate among adherents of both philosophies (as well as those who fall somewhere in between) has occasionally been bitter (and has crept into the political realm.) I fall closer to the empirical end of the scale, though I do believe that there is room for discussion of social construction around scientific models and science as an institution.

Joan Fujimura’s “Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and ‘Translation'” comes from a decided social constructionist perspective (for example, a footnote at the beginning assures the reader that she does not consider “facts” to “represent reality.”) That said, she does present an interesting way of looking at they ways in which scientific concepts are transferred among different fields (though I suspect my watered down view of the role of social negotiation in science would seem inadequate to her.) Here is my summary:

Summary: From a social constructionist perspective, scientific knowledge is produced not by consensus or by referring to objective nature, but by negotiation and argument. Fujimura combines Latour’s “boundary objects” with Star & Griesner’s focus on collective negotiation in constructing scientific “facts.” Fujimura suggests that “standardized packages” of both technologies and a theory (i.e., several related boundary objects) facilitate cooperative work by acting as interfaces between different social worlds. The packages allow cross-communication (via “translation”) and cooperation between disciplines, while still letting disciplines maintain the integrity of their viewpoints. Such packages are more rigid than just single boundary objects, because the different parts co-define one another. She uses the example of oncogenes as a recent conceptual framework for cancer research to illustrate how this process works. In this case, boundary objects include concepts (e.g., gene, cancer), databases (which create a standard language), and sequences (DNA & protein). The primary theory is “translated”/mapped onto existing problems in different fields, e.g., links retroviruses (virology) to oncogenes (genetics), then oncogene proteins to proto-oncogenes (developmental & evolutionary biology.) When used together, shared theories and standard tools can ensure “fact stabilization.”

Comments: Provides a framework for how ideas are communicated across disciplines or among interest groups. Can this be used in a less-extreme constructionist setting? If people can argue about multiple perceptions of a thing, then that suggests that there really is a “thing” out there to argue about (in other words, I believe in reality.)

Links to: Hellsten & Nehrlich (metaphors in sci. comm); Bucchi (metaphors for communication between disciplines)

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exam readings research methods/philosophy science communication

Exam readings: Research into public understanding of science

In my final post of material from the Handbook of Public Communication of Science and Technology, I’ll include info from two chapters on research on public understanding of science. First, Martin Bauer on public survey research:

Summary: Bauer discusses the history of research into PUoS, and outlines three eras of research paradigms. From the 1960s-80s, focus was on “science literacy:” basic literacy and civic competence (facts & methods, appreciation, rejecting superstition). Research assumed a public deficit & measured knowledge and attitudes. Critiques centered around lack of emphasis on trust issues; definition of “superstition;” is literacy a continuum or threshold level; and focus on facts/process rather than knowledge in context. During the mid-80s-mid 90s, “PUoS:” foregrounded public attitude deficit and assumed more knowledge would lead to more positive attitudes toward science. Research was based on one of two assumptions: “rationalist” (people need knowledge and training & will evaluate sci. issues rationally) or “realist” (people decide emotionally, so market-based research.) Critiques: relationships among interest, attitude, and knowledge not clear; and positive attitudes are not correlated with knowledge. From the mid-90s to the present, focus has been on “science in society:” the public’s lack of trust in scientific experts. This research focuses on science as a single sector of society, assumed that decline in public trust leads to a skeptical but informed public, urges more public policy involvement, and generally takes an interventionist stance. Critique of this research paradigm centers on time-consuming nature of focus groups and ethnographies; the creation of a new professional class of evaluators; and suggests a need to return to PUoS measures anyway to see if focus groups actually have any effect on participants.

Comments: Bauer frames these three research paradigms as discourses surrounding research, not as complete shifts in research methods (e.g., old methods still have relevance.) Though field as a whole has shifted, different methods are probably still useful in certain circumstances. An alternative PUoS “successor” is “public participation in science,” which aims to include people directly in research, rather than focus on P.R./trust issues.

Links to: Cornell Lab papers (public participation, as alternative to trust-focused research)

And last,  Federico Neresini and Giuseppe Pellegrini on evaluating communication efforts:

Summary: The authors lay out what seems to be a common-sense approach to evaluating results of research efforts, including the need to clearly state objectives at the outset and evaluate on that basis, usefulness of both quantitative and qualitative methods, and the need to plan for evaluation. They acknowledge that when evaluation becomes structured and formal, there is a political aspect to it. Another thing to do is match methods to the communication model you’re operating under (e.g., deficit model-evaluate public; dialogue model-evaluate all actors in dialogue.) They cover different types of evaluation during project phases (assessing ability to complete objectives, formative eval., summative eval.) For communication, the idea is to establish the extent and nature of change in the audience (or audience + communicators + other actors in discussion.) Changes can occur in knowledge, attitude, mental models, and behavior; different methods are appropriate to measure different types of change. They discuss experimental design issues: problems of correlation vs. cause/effect relationships, pre/post survey biasing of participants, deference to interviewers, and short-term vs. long-term effects.

Comments: Evaluation of communication results is apparently a controversial subject in this field (according to the authors), but their discussion of methods and things to be aware of seems reasonable to me. Fair review of this type of material.

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exam readings museums science communication science studies

Exam reading: Science museums, the Internet, and uncertainty

More from the Handbook of Public Communication of Science & Technology. First, a look at science museums by Bernard Schiele:

Summary: Discusses the historical development of rationales and forms of science museums, as well as consistent purpose (preservation & education) and philosophy (reality is independent of our representations, reality is independent of language, truth is the precise representation of reality, and knowledge is objective.) 16th cen.: beginnings of collections; focus on the correspondence between man and nature; “cabinets of curiosity” & geographic collections. 18th–19th cen.: natural sci. museums with focus on classification (began to organize by non-geographic themes); museums as research centers (tied to growth in collections & development of sciences in 19th cen.); dioramas as spectacle. 19th-20th cen.: science & technology museums; experiment displays (physics & chemistry); achievements of industrial revolution, educational/democratic spirit; showcase “pure” science (sci. thinking & discovery.) 20th cen.: science centers; shift in focus to community (raise interest in sci. literacy & mediate between sci. institutions and the public), interactivity (active learning), and evaluation (of exhibits by pedagogic models); visitor at center of design (use all possible media); new emphasis on risk & uncertainty with progress; focus on science spinoffs, not “pure” science. Ends by discussing the emphasis of the public as museum actors, rather than the museum as a science showcase: broad changes in participation (talks, exhibits, animation) and community relationships (public questions decisions (Enola Gay), reflects broader social questioning of institutions).

Comments: Though Schiele emphasizes continued focus on modernist standards for interpretation & objective knowledge, I have heard of cases where museums offer a more social constructionist/all interpretations are subjective slant to exhibits. Also, recent cases where political/funding decisions may have (at least in the eyes of the public) influenced interpretive materials (Smithsonian (?) Arctic exhibit; Koch-funded Hall of Human Origins).

Links to: Holton (science/anti-science)

Next, how the Internet is changing science communication, by Brian Trench:

Summary: The Internet makes professional and public communication more “porous” and facilitates public access to scientific information; many professional activities are also mediated by the Internet, which facilitates both cooperation and fragmentation/specialization. Public impacts include diffusion of information beyond scientific communities (via news, PR, discussion groups) and new access to previously “hidden” professional processes (professional organization communications, pre-publications, professionals’ discussions, etc.) One major development is the journal open access movement (“revolt” against journal costs, desire to have publicly-funded research results freely available); there are questions about maintaining peer review quality and possible public misinterpretation of non-vetted results. Another development is research institutions hiring science writers, which can lead to journalists being left out of sci. comm. efforts. A third development is communications by individual scientists: blogs, podcasts, etc.- there are various motivations for these efforts, including social commentary, “coffee room chatter.” A primary problem for the public is differentiating between sources of information. For professionals, the questions are how much public scrutiny to invite and how much vetting of new information to do (e.g., developing standards that help people make decisions about source credibility.) Finally, the public is interested in areas of high uncertainty, and explaining that this is a normal part of science is a challenge.

Comments: Trench writes that few institutions with an online presence take advantage of the interactive possibilities of the Internet; this situation seems to be changing to some extent (though numbers are still probably small.)

And last, Alan Irwin tackles the problem of communicating about risk and uncertainty:

Summary: Begins by discussing three (coexisting, not stepped) models of thinking about science: “1st-order” (deficit model), “2nd-order” (engagement/dialogue), and “3rd-order” (the relationship between the first two.) With respect to risk communication, the current trend from deficit communications to dialogue represents a critique of past practices (e.g., the BSE/mad cow example in Great Britain.) The BSE example points to a need for openness to foster trust, recognition of uncertainty, and trust in the public’s ability to respond rationally to scientific problems. The three orders are related to general cultural philosophies. 1st-order focus is on the government’s role in minimizing uncertainty and bringing rationality to society (culture of modernity). 2nd-order thinking involves the need to revitalize institutions in light of risk-related challenges, the need for transparency and mutual trust, and the idea that some interest groups have valuable things to add to discussion. 3rd-order thinking is about considering effects of societal science and technology-related decisions; basically, putting issues into a wider social context and critically evaluating current approaches to communication.

Comments: Irwin points out that scientific progress and transparency aren’t mutually exclusive; this relationship is one of the things that 3rd-order thinking should address. Public engagement shouldn’t be an end unto itself, but should be part of that broader discussion of social implications.

Categories
environment exam readings rhetoric science communication

Exam readings: metaphors and NGOs in science communication

More chapters from the Handbook of Public Communication of Science & Technology. First, Iina Hellsten and Brigitte Nehrlich discuss how metaphors are used to frame new or changing ideas in science:

Summary: Discussion of metaphors as framing devices. In life/medical science, they identify 2 important frames: “breakthrough/key to cure disease” and “playing god/Pandora’s box;” both grounded in a narrative of linear progress (journey or creating a map.) Function of metaphors is to create boundary objects between two or more domains either within science (between disciplines, novel models) or in popularization (help understand complexities, evoke emotion, concretize concepts.) Metaphors are both flexible enough and robust enough to remain identifiable across domains. They approach metaphors as “discourse metaphors:” they evolve within disciplines, but can become fixed and create stable (sometimes limiting) structures. They end with an analysis of the metaphors used in the Human Genome Project: metaphors changed as goals changed (e.g., “language of life” and “mapping” to “blueprint” as unexpectedly few genes discovered), and outdated metaphors are still in use (“book of life” predates idea that genetic info has multiple layers, but attempts to include complexity haven’t caught on, e.g., “orchestra,” “ecology”.) Metaphors also have ethical implications: e.g., journey/race metaphors might possibly exacerbate competition & lead to breaches in research ethics.

Comments: Key concepts: metaphors as boundary objects, metaphors providing internal structure within disciplines, metaphors competing for insight in different contexts. Selection of metaphors is a key popularization issue, esp. in areas of science with large social/political implications.

Next, Steven Yearley discusses a related topic with his chapter on the role of NGOs (specifically environmental NGOs) in science communication:

Summary: Environmental groups and other NGOs rely to a large extent on empirical data to back up their claims, so have a unique need to balance powerful imagery with accuracy. First case study on climate change, in which the primary skeptical position is to cast doubt on research; NGOs find themselves in the (unusual) position of urging the public to accept government/institutional claims, as well as point out the vested interests of denialist groups. This position makes it harder for NGOs to counter “official” views in other situations (a key reason being that, given the wide scope of the IPCC, it’s hard to find peer reviewers that are both informed and disinterested). Second case study on GMOs, in which NGOs have argued that regulation is insufficient compared to the possible magnitude of adverse impacts. The strategy here has been to align with other pressure groups, and basically throw every objection possible at the issue; the more professional NGOs have tried to mobilize public engagement with the issue and have been less successful at drawing public into dialogue than generally riling them up. NGOs are generally wary of stepping out of their role as mediators of public action/lobbying for policy decisions, because they fear govt./business manipulation of public and the unpopularity of the best environmental choices (becomes a case of touting public wisdom when it aligns with their goals).

Comments: Some groups generate their own data; these tend to have a more data- than emotion-based persuasive strategy. This chapter is more useful in an applied context, and not central to the direction my research has been going recently…

Categories
exam readings science communication science studies

Exam readings: Public communication of science & dialogue

Here are summaries for two more chapters from the Handbook of Public Communication of Science & Technology. First, Massimiano Bucchi’s overview of science communication theory provides a good framework for this book, and is something I’ll definitely revisit for my exam:

Summary: Discusses several models of sci. comm., which has arisen as a specialist field as science has become institutionalized and specialized. Bucchi presents a 4-level model for diffusion of ideas (continuity model), and then discusses three models for communication. In his continuity model, texts or ideas go through 4 levels (within a discipline, between disciplines, pedagogic, then popular), though they can jump levels (sometimes deliberately, to “shortcut” the usual process as new metaphors at the popular level are introduced to influence other scientists) or move in the opposite direction (again, metaphors @ popular level). At each step, uncertainty is removed & ideas become facts.

From http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v8n3/hessenbruch.html

Bucchi dislikes idea of comm. as transfer between contexts (b/c of selective perception, non-linearity of comm., active transformation of ideas affecting sci. process); prefers idea of comm. as dialogue between specialist & popular discourses (with models & metaphors as “boundary objects”). (1) The traditional “deficit” model is 1-way and views media as an imperfect channel and public as passive (but able to understand once ideas are “translated”). The role of the scientist is to channel info to media (through press releases, celebrity scientists, prestigious journals). Public has an assumed deficit of knowledge b/c of scientific illiteracy (ability to reason scientifically; concept is countered by “different ways of knowing” idea (science=facts; lay=facts + values, trust, practical applications)). (2) “Dialogue” model includes citizen involvement as a way to enrich discussion (e.g., medicine.) (3) “Participation/co-production” model involves fora to set policy (involve multiple constituencies); this model links to broader discussion of science in society, e.g., non-academic institutions (NGOs, corporations) generating knowledge, open access vs. owned knowledge.

Comments: Continuity model will probably be useful. Another key concept is that different models could be applicable in different situations (deficit model the default in areas of low public interest); depends on level of public salience & mobilization, institutional/expert credibility, and the perceived level of controversy among scientists. Opening “black box” for public discussion leads to conflict and doesn’t fit into rhetoric of knowledge economy, so may be resisted by govt.; but public is not going to want to participate in drawn-out process in many cases. Modeling is fluid (e.g., public needs may change with new info or connection to new controversy) not static.

Connected to this is Edna Einsiedel’s chapter on public participation and dialogue:

Summary: Einsiedel focuses on the recent “participation explosion” in policy decision-making (esp. environment & health stakeholder participation). Public engagement can serve as quality control and create greater/more authentic democracy, but requires access to information, meaningful participation in decision-making, and access to judicial redress in case of problems. For her, a “deficit vs. dialogue” model is too simple- it’s a continuum including public feedback, participation, determining solutions, etc. Historical motivations include limits to expertise, controversies, social movements, and greater recognition of uncertainty. She identifies 4 trends: formalized forms of engagement (e.g., expert panels), increasing frequency of dialogue/participation planning, timing occurring throughout process (not just at end), and content of discussions expanding to include a broad range of values. There are a few main theoretical/normative frameworks for participation: deliberative democracy, technology assessment, deconstruction of “expertise,” and institutional contexts. One key problem is evaluating the process (what type of assessments to use); Einsiedel suggests including both “interested” (e.g., envtl. groups) and “disinterested” (e.g., unaffiliated citizens) parties in order to make sure that a range of views is expressed.

Comments: It seems that dialogue models are highly touted, but Einsiedel suggests that (like usability testing in tech design) organization of these fora can be driven by the need to legitimate decisions that have already been made or pay lip service to public airing of views. This is probably another reason to include organized pressure groups.